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When the present volume ·Nas first conceived, it was confidently believed that a 
survey of the literature on Reinach's thought could be kept within comfortable 
limits. It rapidly became clear, however, that this was not the case. Reinach's dis-
coveries in the sphere of speech act theory have, it is true, gone almost unnoticed. 
Reinach has nevertheless enjoyed an enduring notoriety among those working in 
the philosophy of law, and ever since its appearance in 1913, Reinach's work on 
a Die apriorischen Grundlagen des biirgerlichen Rechtes" has served as the principal 
representative of phenomenologic31, aprioristic and ontological/realist approaches 
in this discipline. His name accordingly appears in the majority of the more sub-
stantial general treatises in the discipline (or at least in those treatises and reference 
works published in countries whose law and philosophy have been influenced by 
the Germanic tradition: Edwards' great Encyclopedia of Philosophy does not 
contain even a mention of Reinach). 
The goal of completeness has therefore been abandoned in what follows, and 
items containing merely passing references to Reinach's work have been listed 
only where they are of particular historical importance or bear evidence of some 
more substantial influence. The list has been compiled with the assistance of N. 
Bokhove, A.G. Conte and M.-E. Conte, J. Crosby, N. Duxbury, J. Joerden, S. 
Paulson, H. Spiegelberg and the indefatigable librarians of the University of Er-
langen. 
§ 1 WORKS BY REINACH 
Under the Sigil Ana 379, C I (Reinach) the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek has pre-
served a short review (by Reinach?) of F. Berolzheimer, System der Rechts- und 
Wirtschaftsphilosophie, vol. I (Munich: Beck, 1904), the original publication and 
author of which has not been traced. Two further questions concerning possible 
Reinach publications remain unanswered: 1) In a letter to Conrad of September 
1910 Reinach refers to his plans to publish an article to be entitled "Natur und 
Freiheit", but this has not been found; 2) Dietrich von Hildebrand, in his Moralia 
(1980, p. 247), refers to a 'nicht erhalten gebliebenen Aufsatz [by Reinach] tiber 
Gesinnung'. Further details as to Reinach's Nachlass can be found on p. 27 above, 
and in Ave-Lallemant 1975. 
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1905 Uber den Ursachenbegriff im ge/tenden Strafrecht, Leipzig: Barth (Disser-
tation, Munich). Psychology, Reinach argues, is capable of assisting in the 
clarification of the legal meaning of the concept of cause via appeal to the 
notion of a psychic regularity. This same notion can help also in the clarifi-
cation of the probable intent of specific laws. From the point of view of 
Reinach's later philosophy, the work may be seen as a study of the legal 
determinations [Bestimmungen] of positive law and of the development 
of aids for their practical interpretation. There is as yet however no sug-
gestion of his doctrine of the a priori structures underlying legal formations. 
1910 !.~>William James und der Pragmatism us", Welt und Wissen. Hannoversche 
Blatter fiir Kunst, Literatur und Lev.!n ( Beilage zum Hannoverschen Cou-
rier), no. 198, 28.9.1910, repr. in Reinach (forthcoming); English trans-
lation in this volume. 
1911 "Kants Auffassung des Humeschen P ·oblems", Zeitschrift fiir Philo sophie 
und philosophische Kritik, 141, 176-209, repr. in Reinach 1921, 1-35. 
1911a "Die obersten Regeln der Vernunftschltisse bei Kant", Kant-Studien, 16, 
214-33, repr. in Reinach 1921, 36-75. 
1911 b "Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils", in A. Pf~nder, ed., Miinchener Philo-
sophische Abhandlungen (Festschrift for Theodor Lipps), Leipzig: Barth, 
196-254, repr. in Reinach 1921,56-102. 
1912/13 "Die Oberlegung; ihre ethische und rechtliche Bedeutung", Zeitschrift 
fur Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 148, 181-96, 149, 30-58, 
repr. in Reinach 1921, 121-65. 
1913 "Die apriorischen Grundlagen des btirgerlichen Rechtes", Jahrbuch fiir 
Philosophie und phiinomenologische Forschung, I/2, 685-847, and as 
Separatum, 1913 and 1922; repr. in Reinach 1921, 166-350 and as Reinach 
1953. 
1914 "'Paul Natorps Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode", Gottin-
gische gelehrte Anzeigen, no. 4, 193-214, repr. in Reinach 1921, 351-76. 
Natorp had claimed that the I can never be an object of consciousness 
and thus it cannot form part of the subject-matter of psychology. The 
latter is restricted to the contents of consciousness, i.e. to all of that of 
which one is conscious. Reinach argues that it is grounded in the essence 
of cogitationes that they can exist only as experiences of an I. Thus he de-
fends the Cartesian view according to which the cogito is the starting 
poing of our knowing, and he insists that the I is present in each and every 
experience. However, the pure I - as distinct from the empirical person -
is not a thing with characteristics; Natorp may therefore be correct in his 
view that it 'does not admit of any explanation'. But this does not rule out 
the clarification of the ways in which it interrelates with other elements in 
essential structures. 
In grasping itself the I is both bearer and end-point of a grasping act. Un-
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like Natorp, who insisted that each relation must have two terms, Reinach 
sees no difficulty here, since intentionality is not a relation in the usual 
sense. (Cf. Brettler, pp. 95f.) 
1921 Gesammelte Schriften, herausgege ben von seinen Schi.ilern (mainly by Edith 
Stein), with an Introduction by Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Halle: Niemeyer. 
1921 a "Vortrag tiber Phanomenologie '' (lecture delivered in Mar burg in 1914 ), 
first publ. in Reinach 1921, 3 79-405, repr. in Reinach 1951. 
1921 b "Uber das Wesen der Bewegung" (prepared by E. Stein from seminar notes 
in Reinach's NachlafS), first publ. in Reinach 1921, 406-61. Contains an 
analysis of continuity and of the essence of traversing of space, the results 
of \Vhich are then applied to Zeno's paradoxes. A motion is a continuous 
process; it should not be thought of as a series of single part-processes 
somehow combined together. 
Reinach asserts that it is self-evident that all real motion requires a 
bearer, but denies that this implies that all perception of motion involves 
the perception of a bearer. 1 can speak of motion and intend motion with-
out at the same intending something that moves. (Cf. Brettler, pp. 90f.) 
1921 c "Anhang" (extracts on impersonalia from Reinach's Nachlafi), first publ. 
in Reinach 1921, 117-20. 
1921 d "Bruchsttick einer religionsphilosophischen Ausftihrung" {28 Sept.-3 
Oct. 191 7), Section 1, "Das Absolute", in Reinach 1921, xxxi-xxxvi. 
1928 Gensh8gaku ni tsuite, {Tetsugaku ron so [Collection of Philosophy] 2), 
Tokyo: Iwanami. Japanese trans. of 1921 a, with introductory note by 
Renz6 Ikegami. 
1934 Los fundamentos aprioristicos del derecho civil, Barcelona: Libreria Bosch, 
Spanish trans. of 1913 by Jose' Luis Alvarez. See Alvarez M. Taladriz 1934. 
1951 Was ist Phiinomenologie?, ed. with a foreword by H. Conrad-Martius, 
Munich: Kosel. 
1953 Zur Phiinomenologie des Rechts. Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bur-
gerlichen Rechts, mit einer Vorbemerkung von Anna Reinach, Munich: 
Kosel, new edition of Reinach 1913. 
1966 ''What is Phenomenology?", Eng. trans. of Reinach 1921 a by David Kelly, 
Philosophical Forum, 1, 231-56. 
1969 "Concerning Phenomenology", Eng. trans. of Reinach 1921a by Dallas 
Willard, The Personalist, 50, 194-211. 
1973 "Zur Phanomenologie der Ahnungen" (MS dated Embagneux, 26 July 1916) 
in Brettler, 245-4 7, with English translation, "On the Phenomenology of 
Premonitions", 242-44. The act of apprehending {knowing) and the state 
of conviction, Reinach here argues, 
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contrast with one another clearly enough, if one considers that the case 
of apprehending concerns a temporally punctual act which cannot 
endure more or less, whereas we can live in a conviction as long as we 
like. Furthermore a set of convictions often comes to life in us without 
being founded in an act of apprehending or at any time having been so 
founded. Observed from this point of view, there is no doubt that we 
have to class premonitions with the founding structures, not with the 
founded ones - i.e. to those which by their essence are open to being 
founded. Through premonitions we grasp - or believe ourselves to 
grasp - the previously hidden. And in premonition a conviction also 
can be founded, which in strength and inner certainty need be in no way 
inferior to the conviction based upon knowing. (trans. p. 244, slightly 
amended) 
1973a "Bruchstiick einer religionsphilosophischen Ausfiihrung", Section 2. "Struk-
tur des Erlebnisses", and Section 3. "Skeptische Erwagungen", in Brettler, 
250-51; with English translation, •'Fragment of a Treatise on the Philo-
sophy of Religion", 248-49. 
1976 "Kant's Interpretation of Hume's Problem", Eng. trans. of Reinach 1911, 
by J.N. Mohanty, Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, 1, 161-88 (this 
issue repr. as K.R. Merrill and R.W. Shahan, eds., David Hume. Many-
Sided Genius, Norman: University of Oklatoma Press). 
1978 Excerpts from Reinach 1921 a in Italian translation in Adriano Bausola, 
ed., Questioni di storiografia filosofica: II pensiero contemporaneo, 4, 
vol. I, Brescia: La Scuola, 41-42. 
1981 "On the Theory of the Negative Judgement", Eng. trans. of Reinach 1911 b, 
by Don Ferrari, A letheia, 2, 15 -64. 
1982 "On the Theory of the Negative Judgement", Eng. trans. of Reinach 1911 b 
by Smith, in B. Smith, ed., 315-77, incorporating translation of Reinach 
1921c. 
1983 "The A priori Foundations of the Civil Law", Eng. trans. of Reinach 1913 
by J .F. Crosby, Aletheia, 3, 1-14 2. 
{forthcoming) &imtliche Werke, a new edition of Reinach's works, including a 





§ 2 WORKS ON REINACH 
1913 Uber die Erkenntnis a priori, insbesondere 
in der Arithmetik, I. Teil, Leipzig: Quelle 
and Meyer. On Reinach and Sachverhalte, 
(pp. 39-49). 
1948 "Change and Contradiction", as trans. in 
K.Ajdukiewicz, The Scientific World-Perspective 
and other Essays, 1931-1963, Dodrecht/ 
Boston: Reidel, 1978, 192-208 (pp. 198f.). 
Alvarez M. Taladriz, J. 
Amselek, Paul 
1934 "Prologo" to Reinach 1934, pp. 5-18. 
1964 Methode phenomenologique et theorie du 
droit, with preface by Charles Eisenmann, 
Paris: Ubrairie generate de Droit et de Juris-
prudence. 
1964a Perspectives critiques d 'une reflex ion epis-
temologique sur Ia theorie du droit: Essai 
de phenomenologie juridique, Paris: Ubrairie 
generate de Droit et de Jurisprudence. 
1972 "La phenomenologie et le droit", Archives 
de philosophie du droit, 17, 185-259, Eng. 
trans. as "The Phenomenological Description 
of Law", in M. Natanson, ed. vol. 2, 1973, 
367-449. 
1986 "Philosophie du droit et the orie des actes 
de langage", in P. Amselek, -ed. Theorie des 
actes de langage (pp. 135, 147), Paris: P.U.F., 
109-63. 
Ave-Lallemant, Eberhard 1971 Phiinomenologie und Realitiit. Vergleichende 
Baeyer, Alexander von 
Baratta, Alessandro 
Untersuchungen zur 'Miinchen-Gottinger' und 
'Freiburger' Philnomenologie, Habilitations-
schrift, Munich (mimeographed). 
1975 Die Nachliisse der Miinchener Phiinomeno-
logen in der Bayerischen Staatsbibliothek, 
Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz (pp. 171-80). Cata-
logue of Reinach's Nachlass with a biographical 
sketch. 
1968 "Bemerkungen zum Verhaltnis von juris-
tischer und philosophischer Hermeneutik", 
Archiv fUr Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 54, 
27-4 2. Includes some discussion of Reinach's 
theory of legal determinations. 
1969 Adolf Reinachs Phiinomenologie. Zum Ver-
hiiltnis von phiinomenologischer Forschung 
und Geschichtlichkeit, Dissertation, Bern. See 
especially the treatment of the distinction 
between the a priori theory of law and natural 
law; the former is descriptive, the latter nor-
mative. 
1959 "Natura del fatto e diritto naturale", Rivista 
internazionale di filosofia del diritto, 36, 
177-228; German translation as "Natur 
der Sache und Naturrecht", in A. Kaufmann, 




1930 "Hexis und Akt. Eine phanomenologische 
Skizze",Philosophischer Anzeiger, 4, 163-68. 
The distinction between hexis and act runs 
through the entire realm of intentional ex-
periences. Examples of hexeis are: being 
acquainted with, knowing, being convinced, 
believing, loving, wanting, etc. Examples of 
acts: perceiving, recognising, deciding, con-
verting, promising, etc. 
The distinction is not merely a matter of 
temporal structure (the distinction of interval 
and point). If one contrasts an action (Tat) 
with, e.g., a state or hexis of being in love, then 
that which is decisive in this contrast is not the 
temporal punctuality of the execution of the 
action. An act, like an action, is a 'punctual 
clicking into place' (Einschnappen ), and what is 
primary here is not so much the punctuality 
as the clicking into place. An action, too, 
can be described - from the outside - as the 
clicking into place of a new external situation. 
Cognition would then correspondingly be the 
clicking into place of a new knowledge-situ-
ation, decision the clicking into place of a new 
will-situation, etc. 
The new distributions of knowledge and will 
which thereby result are clearly hexial, and thus 
it is tempting to see the hexis in general as a 
phenomenon which is in every case the sequel 
to an act. Hexeis such as knowledge, will and 
the like, would then simply be the results of 
cognitive or resolutive acts, as the new external 
situation is a result of the action. But clearly not 
all being can be traced back in this way to a 
becoming. 1 ust as every action already pre-
supposes some situation - does not create 
the world but rather changes it - so every act 
of cognition presupposes some knowledge, and 
from this point of view the hexis is prior to the 
act. 
1930a Das Versprechen. Ein Beitrag zur Philosophie 
der Sittlichkeit und des Rechts, Dessau: Dtinn-
haupt, Berlin: 1 unker and Dtinnhaupt (Disser-
tation, Leipzig). Somewhat superficial criticism 








promise along the lines of the old expression-of-
intention theory. 
193 7/38 "Zur Philosophie des Eigentums", Archiv 
fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 31 , 3 24-51. 
Historical study, setting out from the criticism 
of Reinach's a priori theory of property. 
1949 Problemes de base de philosophie du droit, 
Paris: Librairie generale de Droit et de Juris-
prudence (p. 194f.) 
1923 "Beitrage zur phanomenologischen Begrtindung 
der Geometrie und ihrer physikalischen Anwen-
dung", Jahrbuch fiir Philosophie und phiino-
menologische Forschung, 6, 385-560. On 
Reinach 1921 b (p. 544 ). 
1915 Rechtsbegriff und Rechtsidee, Leipzig: A. 
Diechert, repr. Aalen: Scientia, 1974 (pp. 2, 
128). 
1925 Philosophie des Rechts, Berlin: Georg Stilke, 
(pp. 49-64, 48, 724f, 730, 909f.), repr. Aalen: 
Scientia, 1967. On Reinach's comparison of 
propositions of law and mathematics: every 
jurist who reads these ideas for the first time 
'faBt sich unwillktirlich an den Kopf (p. 152). 
1961 Naturrecht und menschliche Wiirde, Frankfurt: 
Suhrkamp (pp. 164-68: 'Reinach und phano-
menologische Rechtsschau; Auswahl unter 
Leerformen'). 
1931 Urteil und Beurteilung, (Archiv fiir die gesamte 
Psychologie, dritter Erganzungsband), Leipzig: 
Akademische Verlagsanstalt (pp. 81-86 "Das 
negative Urteil "). 
1934 L 'indirizzo fenomenologico nella filosofia so-
ciale e giuridica, Turin: Istituto giuridico della 
R. Universita (pp. 70ff. ). 
1969 "Phanomenologie und Rechtsquellenlehre", in 
T. Wtirtenberger, ed., 72-92. See Reinach, for 
all his faults, as having laid the foundation for 
a deeper treatment of the a priori dimension 







1914 "Critical Notice: Jahrbuch fiir Philosophie und 
[p] hiinomenologische Forschung, Erster Band, 
herausgegeben von E. Husser!", Mind, 23, 
587-97 (pp. 594-6). Bosanquet accuses 
Reinach of confusion in regarding the legal 
obligation created by e.g. a social act of pro-
mising as prior to the moral duty to observe a 
promise. 'None the less for this difference of 
opinion,' he goes on, 'I recognise the excellent 
work done here in bringing home the difficul-
ties of a full and clear statement in answer to 
such questions as "What is the essence of a 
promise? of representation? of property?"' 
(p. 596) 
1973 The Phenomenology of Adolf Reinach: Chap-
ters in the Theory of Knowledge and Legal 
Philosophy, Dissertation (under R. Klibansky ), 
McGill. Extremely useful synoptic treatment, 
making clear the groundlessness of many of the 
more superficial criticisms of Reinach's realist 
theory of cognition, of his theory of a priori 
structures and of his philosophy of law. Con-
sider, for example, Brettler's comparison of 
Reinach and J.L. Austin: 
There are numerous points where 
Austin's work in the end confirms Reinach's 
conclusions, but by contrast the former 
shows itself to be fragmentary, to lack a suf-
ficiently global approach to the speech act. 
The stages of analysis presented by How to 
Do Things with Words appear to fall from 
a phenomenological point of view within the 
stage of concept and word analysis preli-
minary to analysis of the essences them-
selves. {p. 190) 
1964 De l 'unite des doctrines phenomenologiques 
et axiologiques dans Ia theorie generale du 
droit, Toulouse: Annales de la Faculte du 
Droit. 
196 7 Les grands courants de Ia philo sophie du droit 
et de l'etat, Paris: A. Pedone (pp. 375ff.: "La 
vision phenome'nologique du Droit: L'eidetique 




Conte, Amedeo G. 
Conte, Maria-Elisabeth 
Cossio, Carlos 
1921 Recht und Gewalt, Berlin and Leipzig: W. 
de Gruyter (pp. 83f). 
1986 Soziale Akte und Textillokutionen, Ttibingen: 
Niemeyer. A detailed comparison of Reinach 
on social acts with the accounts of Searle and 
Austin who are criticised for committing the 
'ontological fallacy': they find forces in utter-
ances. 
1921 "Einleitung" to Reinach 1921, v-xxxvii. 
1951 "Vorwort" to Reinach 1951, 5-17. 
1957 Das Sein, Munich: KoseL Especially ch. A.2, 
"Das sachverhaltsimmanente Sein", on PHinder 
and Reinach (pp. 19-31 ). 
1983 "[Reinach as a Philosophical Personality] ", 
Eng. trans. of extracts from Conrad-Martius 
1921 by J.F. Crosby, Aletheia, 3, xxx-xxxi. 
1962 Saggio sulla completezza degli ordinamenti 
giuridici, Turin: Giappichelli (p. 104). 
1970 "Studio per una teoria della validita", Rivista 
internazionale di filosofia del diritto, 4 7, 331-
54 (pp. 341ff.). 
1981 "Variationen tiber Wittgensteins Regelbegriff', 
in R. Haller, ed., Sprache und Erkenntnis als 
soziale Tatsache, Vienna: Halder-Pichler-Temp-
sky, 69-78. 
1985 Nove studi sui linguaggio normativo (1967-
1978), Turin: Giapichelli,(p. 49). 
1983 "La pragmatica linguistica", in C. Segre, ed., 
Intomo alia linguistica, Milan: Feltrinelli, 
94-128 (p. 98). 
1952 "las posibilidades de la logica juridica segun 
la logica de Husserl. El manejo fenomenologico 
en Adolf Reinach", Revista de Ia Facultad de 
Derecho (Buenos Aires), 1294-1306. 
1960 "La norma y el imperativo en Husserl. Notas 
analiticas para su estudio", Anuario de Filoso[ia 
del Derecho (Madrid), 7, 5 1-169, Part IV: "El 
manejo fenomenologico de Adolf Reinach" 
(pp. 125-38). Parts I and II of this paper are 
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Crosby, John F. 
Crosby, John F. 




published under the same title in Revista 
Brasileira de Filosofia, 10, 1960, 43-90 and 
translated as "La norme et l'imperatif chez 
Husserl" in Melanges en l'honneur de Paul 
Roubier. Tome 1: Theorie generale du droit 
et droit transitoire, Paris: Dalloc and Sirey, 
1961, 145-98. 
The Spanish and Latin American literature on 
Reinach has been dealt with in what follows 
only cursorily. This applies in particular to the 
work of Cossio. The influence of Reinach's a 
priori theory of law is clear e.g. from Cossio's 
"Phenomenology of the Decision" in G. Ireland, 
eta/., eds., 354-400. 
1964 Le teoria egol6gica del derecho y el concepto 
juridico de libertad, 2nd ed., Buenos Aires: 
Abeledo-Perrot (p. 353). 
1982 "Towards Deriving What Ought to Be in the 
Nature of What Is", in E. Morscher and J. 
Seifert, eds., Vom Wahren und Guten, Salzburg: 
St. Peter, 187-204. 
1983 "A Brief Biography of Reinach", Aletheia, 
3, ix-x. 
1983a "Reinach's Discovery of the Social Acts", 
Aletheia, 3, 143-94. 
1981 "Introduction [to Reinach 1981] ", Aletheia, 
2, 9-14. 
1977 "Edmund Husserl and 'the as yet, in its most 
important respect, unrecognised greatness of 
Hume"', in G. Morice, Ed., David Hume. Bi-
centenary Papers, Edinburgh: Edinburgh Uni-
versity Press, 69-76. 
1928 Uber die sogenannten Funktionen der Sprache. 
Ein Beitrag zur Sprachphilosophie im Anschluj3 
an die Sprachtheorie Karl Biihlers, Disser-
tation (under P.F. Linke), Jena, repr. as Was 
is Sprache? Eine sprachphilosophische Unter-
suchung im Anschluj3 an die Sprachtheorie 
Karl Biihlers, Weimar: Bohlaus Nachfolger, 
1930 (p. 45: on the relation between asser-
tion and conviction in Reinach's 1911 b). 
Diedler, Daniel 






Hendrik Jan (van) 
Elsenhans, Theodor 
1975 La theorie de l'a priori en droit d'Adolf Rei-
nach, memoire pour le diplome d'etudes supe-
rieures, Universite de Paris-11 (mimeographed). 
1927 "Die Begriffsbestimmung des Rechts in der 
phanomenologischen Rechtsphilosophie", Zeit-
schrift fiir offentliches Recht, 6, 246-58 (pp. 
249ff. ). Also in Rudolf Aladar Me tall, ed., 
33 Beitriige zur reinen Rechtslehre, Vienna: 
Europa-Verlag, 1974,47-60. 
1954 "Das Problem des Naturrechts" (first pub-
lished in Norwegian), Ger. trans. in W. Mai-
hofer, ed., 444-62 (p. 453). 
1957 "Existentialisme, phenomenologie et philoso-
phie du droit", Archives de philo sophie du 
droit, 2, 221-31. Brief survey of existen-
tialist and phenomenological philosophy of law. 
1965 Zum Begriff der 'Natur der Sache', Berlin: de 
Gruyter. Esp. § 16 (pp. 60-66) on institutional 
and phenomenological legal theory. The pheno-
menological method rests on the premiss that 
there is an agreement between the a priori 
and the empirical realm. Reinach's concepts are 
therefore not presuppositionless, but can be 
reduced to empirical ones. 
1932 Rechtsphilosophische Scheinprobleme und der 
Dualismus im Recht, Berlin-Grunewald: Roth-
schild, Beiheft 27 to Archiv fur Rechts- und 
Wirtschaftsphilosophie (pp. 121, 13 7, 180). 
1966 "De betekenis van Edmund Husserls trans-
cendentale fenomenologie voor de rechtsweten-
schap", in De fenomenologische methode in 
de rechtsfilosofie, (Handelingen van de Vereni-
ging voor Wijsbegeerte des Rechts, L/1) Zwolle: 
Tjeenk Willink, 5-32 (pp. 6, 10ff., 28). 
1972 Hoofdlijnen van de geschiedenis der rechts-
filosofie, Deventer: Kluwer (pp. 227f.), Eng. 
trans. Major Trends in the History of Legal 
Philosophy, Amsterdam and New York: North-
Holland (pp. 260f.). 
1915 "Phanomenologie, Psychologie, Erkenntnis-
theorie", Kant-Studien, 20,224-75. Argues that, 
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Emge, Carl August 
Engisch, Karl 
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despite all protests to the contrary, the pheno-
menological method is not able to exclude em-
pirical elements. Thus in order to verify the 
results of Reinach's analysis, the reader must 
call to mind various actual cases in which he 
has made or received promises, and he can 
never rule out the possibility that this veri-
fication will not itself be subject to future cor-
rection. This casts doubt on the claim that a 
single exemplification of the relevant structure 
is a sufficient basis for the grasping of the 
essences involved. 
1924/25 "Uber die Zusammenhange zwischen Sozio-
logie und Rechtswissenschaft einerseits, zwi-
schen Religionsphilosophie und Geschichtsphilo-
sophie und Rechtsphilosophie andererseits, 
eine Vorschule der Rechtsphilosophie", Archiv 
fiir Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie, I: 
17, 524-69, II: 18, 30-57, III: 18, 271-
317 and also as a book: Vorschule der Rechts-
philosophie, Berlin: Rothschild. See II, pp. 
31, 54, on the treatment of the tie between 
essential structures in law and more general 
structures in society. 
1928 "Das A priori und die Rechtswissenschaft", 
Archiv fiir Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphiloso-
phie, 21, 519-36 (p. 535). 
1971 Auf der Suche nach der Gerechtigkeit. Haupt-
themen der Rechtsphilosophie, Munich: Piper, 
(esp. pp. 19f. on essential insight and pp. 223-
27, a generous summary of Reinach's philo-
sophy of law): 
We cannot deal with all the details of Rei-
nach's work, but risk only the following 
general criticism, that the 'eternal laws' of 
the a priori theory of law are either analy-
tic judgements or they are not evident (p. 
227). 
1983 "Formale Logik, Begriff und Konstruktion 
in ihrer Bedeutung und Tragweite ftir die 
Rechtswissenschaft", in GUnter Kohlmann, 
ed., Festschrzft fiir Ulrich Klug zum 70. Ge-
burtstag, vol. I, Rechtsphilosophie, Rechts-







1982 Lugen. Grundzzige einer Theorie der sprach-
lichen Tiiuschung, Ttibingen: Niemeyer {Lin-
guistische Arbeiten, 86). 
1984 "Unaufrichtigkeit und Unredlichkeit", Mittei-
lungen des Deutschen Germanistenverbandes, 
31, 15-19. Refers to Reinach's 'pioneering 
attempt' to produce a taxonomy of speech 
acts. 
1970 Storia della filosofia del diritto, vol. III, Otto-
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